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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE LIABILITY OF INSANE PERSONS IN TORT ACTIONS
By
ROBERT M. AGUE, JR.*
I Introduction
If you were to ask the average attorney, candidly, whether or not an insane
person is liable for his torts, he would probably answer that he is not. This is
true because the chances are decidedly against the average lawyer ever having
to consider the question seriously; and, hence, he has never had occasion to re-
fer to his books. In addition, he thinks of criminal law in pari materia and comes
up with the McNaughton rules.
Actually, the overwhelming majority of the limited decisions available on
the subject are to the contrary. It will be the purpose of this article to examine
these decisions, review their background and, finally, to arrive at some con-
clusions. Cases arising in the United States will be emphasized; however, where
the writer deems it necessary for clarification and background material, cases
in other jurisdictions will be considered.
II Civil Law View
Apparently on the theory that only persons with the faculty of clear thought
and reason are capable of legal fault, the civil law historically does not hold in-
sane persons responsible for the damage they occasion by their acts.' Some civil
codes, while not classifying mental defectives into types, exclude from liability
all those of unsound mind or of impaired mental, processes. 2 The responsibility
of guardians or custodians of incompetent persons is dependent upon a duty
of surveillance and negligence or fault in the accomplishment of this duty. The
more modern civil codes state that guardians of mental defectives are liable
only when they are at fault and are not held to an absolute liability.3
The Roman law also excepted madmen from responsibility for their acts.4
Louisiana, having a combination of common law and civil law, holds that an
insane person is not responsible for his acts which damage another. 5 As we
shall see, however, this is one aspect of law the common law did not borrow
from the Roman law.
* LL.B. University of Miami, LL.M. University of Wisconsin, Member of the Wisconsin Bar.
1 DIGEST 9.2.5.2.; Las Siete Partidas, 7.9.8; Pothier Traite des obligations I (Nouvelle ed
1821) Mo 118, p. 158; Colin et Capitant, cours elementaire de droit civil francais II (7e ed
1932) Mo 188, p. 176.
2 JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 713; ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE, art. 1110; GERMAN CIVIL CODE,
art. 827; Quebec Civil Code, art. 1023.
3 GERMAN CIVIL CODE, art. 832; JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 714; SPANISH CIVIL CODE, arts.'
1902, 1903; Argentine Civil Code, arts. 1150, 1151.
4 SANDARS, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, 425 (1st Am. ed. 1876).
5 Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. App. 1934).
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III English Background
A search of the authorities seems to indicate that up to and including the
fifteenth century insanity was not regarded by the common law of England as
a ground for mitigating liability for the payment of compensation to one who
had been injured by a lunatic.6 However, no case in point could be discovered.
The reason for the dearth of cases is probably a very practical one. In the very
early, unenlightened years an insane person "contained the devil" and was look-
ed upon as something evil-to be despised and cast out. Psychology and psychiatry
were centuries in the future. Trial by ordeal was the popular practice. Perhaps
the insane would be thrown into snake pits where the snakes decided questions
of torts by direct action.
7
At any rate, the entire Anglo-American common law on the subject seems
to stem from the dictum in the early English case of Weaver v. Ward.8 It is ad';
visable to peruse the whole opinion in that case. It should be remembered that
this was not an action where insanity was claimed as a defense.
"Weaver brought an action of assault and battery against Ward.
The defendant pleaded that he was amongst others by the command-
ment of the Lords of the Council a trained soldier in London . . . and
so was the plaintiff, and that they were skirmishing with their mus-
quets charged with powder . . . and as they were so skirmishing, the
defendant causualiter et per infortuniam et contra voluntatem suam, in
discharging of his piece, did hurt and wound the plaintiff . • . and
upon demurrer for the plaintiff, judgment was given for him: for
though it were agreed, that if men tilt or tourney in the presence of
the King, or if two masters of defence playing their prizes, kill one
another, that this shall be no felony; or if a lunatic kill a man, or the
like, because felony must be done animo felonico; yet in trespass, which
tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so; and
therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature
of an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit) except
it may be judged utterly without his fault. As if a man by force take
my hand and strike you, or if here the defendant had said that the
plaintiff had ran across his piece when it was discharging, or had set
forth the case with the circumstances, so as it had appeared to the court
that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no
negligence to give occasion to the hurt." (Emphasis added.)
This statement of Seventeenth Century law is quite a mixture of tres-
pass, negligence and criminal law! However, it should be remembered that at
the time of this opinion (1616) liability without fault was the rule. Our con-
cept of no liability without fault is relatively new, having made tremendous
strides only in the last century. People acted at their peril, and no extenuation
was acceptable.
6 W. G. H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COL. L. REv. 333 (1921).
7 Note, 34 COR. L. Q. 274 (1948).
8 134 Hobart (1616).
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The qualification in the above opinion "except it may be judged utterly
without his fault" and following, was an innovation to the law at that time.
It marked the beginning of our present-day concept of no liability withoit fault.
An analysis of the judgment indicates that the statement regarding the liability
of a lunatic, while in accord with the law then, is inconsistent with the state-
ment "except it may be judged utterly without his fault.'' 9 On the one hand
the court has said that a lunatic is liable for trespass, and on the other that
a person may be excused if he is utterly without fault. Who could be more ut-
terly without fault than one who does not realize the nature or consequences
of his acts? It is easily seen how little thought was given to the machinations
of the insane in this period.
Another English case decided a few years prior to the above was Cross v.
Andrews.'0 Although frequently cited in our early American cases, its signif-
icance, at best, is doubtful. This was an action on the case against an innkeep-
er, and declared, upon the common custom of the realm, that an innkeeper
should keep the goods of the guests safely. Defendant pleaded that when the
plaintiff lodged with him he was sick and of "non-sane memory" by occasion
of his sickness. The plaintiff demurred, and it was adjudicated without his
argument. The court held the defendant liable saying that if one wants to be
an innkeeper he should guard his guests' goods at his peril.
This holding is a correct one, since wherever liability is imposed regard-
less of fault, there is no reason why insanity, which merely should mitigate
fault, should constitute a valid defense. However, this case may even have been
decided on principles of contract and is of dubious relevance to the immediate
problem.
Inevitable accident was, of course, also no excuse under the obsolete theory
of liability without fault. Explaining his views on the subject, Lord Bacon said:
... if a man be killed by misadventure, as by an arrow at butts,
this hath a pardon of course; but if a man be hurt or maimed only, an
action of trespass lieth, though it be done against the party's mind and
will, and he shall be punished for the same as deeply as if he had
done it of malice. . . So if an infant within years of discretion, or
a madman, kill another, he shall not be impeached thereof; but if
they put out a man's eye or do him like corporal hurt, he shall be pun-
ished in trespass."'" (Emphasis added.)
This leads us to the unfortunate, but inevitable conclusion that if, in Bacon's
time, you were going to injure someone you had better do a good job of it!
If he had died, you were vindicated; if he had lived and you had only maimed
him, you were liable. The least said about this the better.
9 HARPER, READINGS IN TORTS, 14, 15 (1941).
10 2 Cro. Eliz. 622 (1598).
11 7 WORKS 348, ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW, § VII (Spedding ed. 1630).
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Speaking, among other things, of lunatics, Sir Matthew Hale said: 12
"Ordinarily none of these do excuse those persons, that are under
them, from civil actions to have a pecuniary recompense for injuries
done, as trespass, batteries, woundings; because such a recompense is
not by way of penalty, but a satisfaction for damages done to the
party."
In 1891 the decision in the Weaver case was considered by Justice Den-
man.13 He stated that what the case really decided was that "no man shall
be excused of a trespass . . . except it may be judged utterly without his fault."
Is this just another example of a court refusing to overrule a case completely
and, hence, construing it in a more modern light? Or is this what the case ac-
tually held? It is submitted that the latter is probably more accurate; however,
it may be that it is unnecessary to decide the question. In any event, whether
it be a new construction or the original decision clarified, it is submitted that
it is impossible to accept without qualification the dictum as to the liability of
lunatics. It is difficult to see how we can reconcile in one opinion a statement
that lunatics are liable for their trespasses, and another that those persons ut-
terly without fault will be excused.
For the past three centuries in England, although no cases could be un-
covered to support argument either way, the general opinion in legal circles
seemed to be that a lunatic who knew not what he was doing would not be
liable for his torts. Some eminent writers in the field of torts expressed their
opinion as follows:
.. . .lunatics are liable for torts to the same extent as sane per-
sons, provided that the torts are committed by them while in that con-
dition of mind which is essential to liability in sane persons. In its
absence there is no voluntary act at all. In cases where liability de-
pends on some specific state of mind (e.g., malicious prosecution,
libel on a privileged occasion), lunacy may be strong evidence to show
that the necessary element is lacking and may therefore be a good
defence."14
In a recent case 15 the old controversy was once again revived in England.
The defendant had been a mental patient in a hospital for the insane. He was
released by the proper authorities, but after he had obtained his freedom it
was discovered that the order was invalid. Before he could be apprehended
he attacked and seriously injured the plaintiff. When he was charged with crim-
inal assault he was found to be free from criminal liability because of his insan-
ity. The plaintiff then sued in tort for his damages, and the court held the de-
fendant liable. The court made an attempt to distinguish between "intention-
al" and "voluntary" acts of the insane. It appears that the defendant knew
12 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, C. I., pp. 15, 16, (New ed. 1778).
13 Stanley v. Powell, I Q.B. 86, 91 (1891).
14 CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS, 86 (10th ed. 1947). See also 21 HALSBURY's LAWS OF
ENGLAND 498 (2nd ed.); POLLACK ON TORTS 47 (15th ed.).
15 Morriss v. Marsden, 1 T.L.R. 947 (1952),
VOL. 60
THE LIABILITY OF INSANE PERSONS IN TORT ACTIONS
the nature and quality of his act, but did not know that it was wrong.16 This
case is noted and criticized in several articles.17 "Clearly the question as to
the liability of lunatics in the English law of tort remains difficult and unset-
tled. The weight of authority and judicial opinion, however, is swinging the
balance in favor of holding insane persons liable."'18 There is little doubt that
this case will become a leading precedent in the law of torts because, as Jus-
tice Stable points out in the opinion, there is singularly little authority con-
cerning the tortious liability of the lunatic.19
IV Trend in the United States
In the United States, as in England, the liability of insane persons for their
torts is based on the inconsistent dictum in the Weaver case, decided in Eng-
land in 1616. Probably considered as the leading American case on the subject
is Williams v. Hays,20 so frequently cited that mention of it is even made in
the completely unrelated Palsgraf case.21
This was an action to recover the loss of a vessel, alleged to have been
destroyed by the defendant's negligence. The defendant, who was one of sev-
eral joint owners of the vessel, owning a minority interest, was sailing her
under a contract with the others. He was to take the vessel as captain, man her,
pay the crew, furnish supplies and have absolute management and control over
her.
The vessel encountered storms and the defendant was constantly on duty
for almost three straight days. Becoming exhausted he retired to his cabin leav-
ing the ship in charge of his first mate and the crew. The mate discovered that
the rudder was broken and useless and called the captain on deck, but he re-
fused. Dogmatically the defendant-captain asserted that there was nothing wrong
with the ship and that she was in no trouble. He refused the aid of tugs whose
services were offered to him, their masters warning him that his ship was drift-
ing toward shore. The following day the vessel did strike the shore without
any effort on the part of the defendant to save her. The ship and entire cargo
were a total loss.
The defendant claimed as a defense that he was not responsible due to his
temporary insanity. The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that the
defendant, if sane, was liable for negligence, but if insane was not responsible
for the loss. The verdict was for the defendant. But this was reversed and judg-
ment rendered the plaintiffs, Judge Earl saying, "If the defendant had become
16 The McNaughton Rules of Criminal Law did not apply.
17 Eric C. E. Todd, The Liability of Lunatics in the Law of Tort, 26 AUsT. L. J. 299 (1952);
G. H. L. Fridman, 102 L. J. 325, 326 (1952); 68 L. Q. REV. 300-2 (1932); Eric C. E. Todd,
Insanity as a Defense in a Civil Action of Assault and Battery, 15 MODERN L. REV. 486 (1952);
96 SOL. J. 421 (1952); 213 L. T. 369 (1952).
18 Eric C. E. Todd, The Liability of Lunatics in the Law of Tort, 26 AusT. L. J. 299, 303 (1952).
19 68 L. Q. REV. 300, 302 (1952).
20 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449 (1894).
21 "Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 102 (1928).
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insane solely in consequence of his efforts to save the vessel during the storm,
we would have had a different case to deal with."22 The imposition of liability
on an insane person would seem to have approached an extreme here.23
Upon second appeal, 24 the court formally adopted Mr. Justice Earl's sug-
gested exception, basing it upon the maxim that "there is no obligation to per-
form impossible things," and reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground
that the trial court should have submitted to the jury the question of whether
the defendant's insanity was the result of exhaustion brought on by his efforts
to save the ship.
25
The opinion of Justice Earl in this case seems to fall short of the vigor
and lucidity of reasoning which usually characterized that learned gentleman.
It is sometimes a little difficult to understand precisely what the theory of the
judge was as to the test to be applied to the liability of the defendant. The
result of this obscurity in the opinion was that the courts promptly ran into
difficulty in attempting to follow this enigmatic decision.26 It should be made
clear at this point that, while this is considered the leading American case, it
is an action for negligence, and, as will be seen later, the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases are concerned with torts of the wilful variety.
One of the leading American cases concerning the liability of insane per-
sons for actions of trespass is Ward v. Conatser.2 7 The defendant Conatser shot
Ward, seriously and permanently injuring him. The plaintiff sued in trespass
and the defendant's sole defense on appeal was his claim of insanity at the
time the act was committed. He contended that this relieved him of liability
for the consequences of the shooting. The trial court charged the jury that in-
sanity could not be looked to as a justification for the shooting, but that an in-
sane person would be liable for the actual damage resulting from the injury in-
flicted, but not for punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Tennessee said in
upholding the charge:
"The evidence tended to establish the insanity of Ward, and we
are of opinion that the charge is a correct exposition of the law ap-
plicable to the facts of the case, and contains ample and accurate in-
structions upon all the questions presented in the pleadings and evi-
dence."
28
The decision in this case indicated that the Weaver case was to have more
than a little influence on the courts in the United States. And so, insane de-
22 Williams v. Hays, supra note 20, at 451.
28 W. R. Littlejohn, Torts-Liability of an Epileptic for Damage Caused by Negligence, 1 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 499, 501 (1949).
24 Williams v. Hays, 157 N.Y. 541, 52 N.E. 589 (1899).
25 Insane Persons, Tort Liability, 22 MINN. L. REv. 853, 859 (1938).
26 After this appeal the suit was discontinued, a practical victory for the defendant.
27 63 Tenn. 64 (1874).
28 Id. at 65.
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fendants have been found civilly liable for assaults and batteries nine times,' -9
and batteries which resulted in wrongful death another nine times3 0 In one
case"' the insane defendant was found not liable for assault, but the decision
was based on the lack of the essential elements of assault in Michigan, and his
insanity was not an issue. The defendant was a transvestite who frightened
a neighbor woman into a miscarriage. An insane defendant was found not liable
for a battery causing wrongful death in an Alabama case,' 2 but again the issue
was clouded. The damages provided for in the Alabama wrongful death statute
were held by the court to be punitive in nature and not compensatory. Since
it has always been held that punitive damages cannot be recovered from an in-
sane defendant," insanity was held to be a valid defense.
The lunatic has been found civilly liable for arson on four occasions.' 4 In
fact, in one case" where an insane person was sued for burning down another's
barn, the court by refusing the defendant's request for an instruction, in effect
held that, had the insane defendant burned the building by accident (without
fault), the court's decision would still be for the plaintiff. This would seem
to be a holding of the insane defendant to a higher standard than that required
for the sane.
Insane persons twice have been found compensatorily responsible for crim-
inal conversation and alienation of affection.' 6 He is liable when he sets his
dogs on a neighbor's mare even though the mare is trespassing,' 7 for destroy-
ing a painting, 3" and for killing an ox bailed to him even though the plaintiff
knew he was insane when he gave him custody of the ox.89
29 Van Vooren v. Cook, 273 App. Div. 88, 75 N.Y.S. 2nd 362, (4th Dept. 1947); McGuire
v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E. 2nd 760 (1937); Sauers v. Sack, 34 Ga. App. 748, 131 S.E.
98 (1925); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918); Gibson v. Pollack,
179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S.W. 847 (1914); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Francisco, 149 Ky.
307, 148 S.W. 46 (1912); Moore v. Home, 153 N.C. 413, 63 S.E. 409 (1910) ; Feld v. Boro-
dofski, 87 Miss. 727, 40 So. 816 (1906); Ward v. Conatser, 63 Tenn. 64 (1874).
30 Deposit Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss. 335, 54 So. 2nd 476 (1951)
Ross v. York, Tex. , 233 S.E. 2d 347 (1950); Roberts v. Hayes, 284 I11. App. 275, 1
N.E. 2d 711 (1936); Phillips Committee v. Ward's Admr., 241 Ky. 25, 43 S.W. 331 (1931)
Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 Pac. 348 (1927); Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S.W.
155 (1910); Bollinger, Adm'r. v. Rader, 153 N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910) ; Jewell Adm'r.
v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 At. 902 (1890); McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 11. 660, 13 N.E. 239
(1887).
31 Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466 (1899).
82 Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396 (1928).
33 Moore v. Horne, 153 N.C. 413, 63 S.E. 409 (1910); Ward v. Conatser, 63 Tenn. 64
(1874); Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 647 (N.Y. 1848).
34 In re Guardianship of Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935) ; Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
v. Showalter, 2 Pa. Super. 452 (1897); Karow v. Continental Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 56, 15 N.W.
27 (1883); Kross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 (1870).
35 Kross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 (1870).
36 Sweeney v. Carter, 24 Tenn. App. 6, 137 S.W. 892 (1939); Shedrick v. Lathrop, 106 Vt.
311, 172 At. 630 (1934).
87 Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258 (Ind. 1842).
38 Williams v. Careron, 26 Barb. Ch. 172 (N.Y. 1857).
39 Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (1845).
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The early American cases concerning the tort liability of lunatics were de-
famation, libel or slander actions. Up to the present time this writer has found
a total of seven such cases. 40 In all but one41 of these the defendant was found
not liable. The underlying theory is that while an insane person is generally
held liable for his torts, if an essential ingredient to the tort is intent, malice
or a certain state of mind, then he cannot be held liable for such a tort. One
of the ingredients necessary to maintain the action is missing since an insane
person is incapable of entertaining a given intent or malice. 42 It is also said
that this may be a valid reason for so holding, but maybe a better reason
would be that since the declarer of the words is insane the slandered plaintiff
will have no damages because nobody hearing the words would believe them.
It is certainly easy to see, at any rate, that it would have a decided bearing on
the measure of the damages in such a case.
The lone exception mentioned above, of course, found the insane defend-
ant liable. The court stated:
"No matter if there be a complete absence of malice, or even if
the motive of the publisher be good and virtuous, he cannot escape
paying the actual damage done, unless he justifies by proving the
charge, any more than one who commits an unjustifiable battery may
so escape. Even an accidental or inadvertent publication of defamatory
matter is ground for an action for the actual damage done; and a lun-
atic is liable for the actual damage done by his libels, the same as
for his other torts, though he is incapable of malice, and therefore not
liable to smart money.'
8
4
Speaking theoretically, if we are going to hold lunatics liable the same
as sane persons except where a certain state of mind is necessary, this lone ex-
ception is closer to the correct solution than the others. It would appear to
this writer that there is an absolute liability for defamation where the charges
cannot be proved. At least this seems to be the law in the majority of the
states today. Even an inadvertent publication of libelous material is actionable.
Where everyone is held to a strict liability there is no reason why the insane
should not also be so accountable. Insanity should only mitigate fault, and where
fault does not have to be shown the mentally deranged should be held to the
same standard as all other persons.
Insane persons have been liable for fraud 44 where, being adjudged in-
sane, they had fraudulently pretended they had been readjudged sane and mort-
40 Wilson v. Walt, 138 Kan. 205, 25 P.2d 343 (1933); Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 77
S.W. 1106 (1904); Ulrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. 169, 50 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1898);
Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199 (Tenn. 1845); Yeates and Wife v. Reed and Wife, 4 Blackf.
463 (Ind. 1838) ; Horner v. Marshall's Achninistratrix, 5 Murf. 466 (Va. 1817); Dickinson
v. Barber, 9 Mass. 224 (1811).
41 Ulrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. 169, 50 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1898).
42 See 44 C.J. S., Insane Persons, § 122 (1945); 28 AM. JUR., Insane and Other Incompetent
Persons, § 93 (1940).
48 Kross v. Kent, 32 Md. 790 (1870).
44 Spaulding v. Harvey, 129 Ind. 106, 28 N.E. 322 (1891).
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gaged some property. However, in another case 45 where a wife was suing to
annul her marriage on the ground that her husband had fraudulently concealed
from her his hopeless insanity, the court held that he could not be capable of
the deceit and deception underlying fraud. The court refused to annul the mar-
riage but seemed to rely on the doctrine of caveat emptor for its decision.
Lunatics have been found liable for wrongfully suing out a writ4 6 and
for trespass to land. 47 In two cases 48 where the incompetent's property was
under the care of a committee or guardian, and an innocent third party was in-
jured because of the negligent repair of the property, the insane person was
found liable. In two other cases 49 involving the same or similar facts he was
held not responsible. This question would seem to be undecided with no solu-
tion in sight in the near future. This writer favors the argument set down by
the court in one of the cases finding the incompetent not liable:
"If there was any negligence proved in this case, it was not that
of the incompetent person; for the circumstances upon which the claim
of negligence is predicated did not arise until some years after the de-
fendant took charge of said premises as such committee." 50
and the same court speaking of the committee:
"The reason why it cannot be held liable in its representative
capacity is that the estate of the incompetent must not be subjected
to a liability for the torts of one who is not his agent in the legal sense.
This reason falls far short of exempting the committee individually."5 1
Certainly it would seem to meet the ends of justice to hold responsible the
tortious guardian or committee individually, rather than furthering the woes
of the one stricken insane by holding him for these tortious acts about which
he knows nothing. The insane person cannot even legally appoint an agent,
so why should we hold him liable on agency principles?
There are two interesting cases involving automobiles that should be dis-
cussed in detail. The first, Gillet v. Shaw,52 involved an adjudged (and institu-
tionalized) lunatic whose father appointed a committee to handle his affairs.
The doctor in charge of the hospital purchased an automobile allegedly as part
of the incompetent's recommended treatment, and hired a chauffeur to drive
it. The chauffeur negligently operated the automobile and struck and injured
45 Chaddock v. Chaddock, 130 Misc. 900, 226 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1928).
46 Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa 333 (1867).
47 Cathcart v. Matthews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 S.E. 1021 (1916).
48 Campbell v. Bradbury, 179 Cal. 364, 176 Pac. 685 (1919); Morain v. Devlin, 132 Mass.
87 (1882).
49 Rooney v. Peoples' Trust Co., 61 Misc. 159, 114 N.Y. Supp. 612 (1908); Ward v. Rogers,
51 Misc. 299, 100 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (1906).
50 Rooney v. Peoples' Trust Co., 61 Misc. 159, 114 N.Y. Supp. 612 (1908).
61 Id. at 614.
52 117 Md. 508, 83 Ad. 394 (1912).
58 Id. at 514.
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the plaintiff who sued the lunatic. The defendant was not present in the auto-
mobile at the time of the accident. The court held:
"We therefore, hold upon both reason and the great weight of
authority that the defendant can not be held liable in this case; first,
because the tort was not committed by him personally or in his pres-
ence or by his direction; secondly, because not being capable of ap-
pointing. an agent, he is not personally liable for the acts of one claimed
to be his agent and not being personally liable neither his property
or estate can be held liable in damages therefore; third, because the
tort in this case was not the tort of the lunatic, but the tort of the
chauffeur, who was not his agent but the employee of his guardian;
and fourthly, because the tort of a servant or employee of a guardian
of a lunatic can not bind the lunatic either personally or render his
property liable under the special facts of this case."
Because of the atrocious grammar, the repetition and frequent errors and omis-
sions of punctuation, it is a little difficult to ascertain exactly what the court
has said above. But breaking it down very briefly, the court has held that the
lunatic is not liable for the torts of one who merely acts as his agent by ap-
pointment from the lunatic's guardian, and such agent cannot bind the luna-
tic personally nor make his estate liable. This apparently is especially true when
the lunatic is not even present when the tort is committed.
The next case, a more recent one, is Ellis v. Fixico.14 Katie Fixico, an ad-
judged incompetent, owned an automobile and had hired a chauffeur to drive
it for her. The day the accident occurred Katie was riding blissfully in the
back seat when the chauffeur negligently and recklessly struck the plaintiff caus-
ing the injuries. The plaintiff sued the incompetent and recovered on the ground
that, since Katie was present in the car, it was assumed that it was under her
direction and control.
It will be seen that the difference between the two cases is merely that in
one the lunatic was present at the time of the accident, and in the other, he was
not. Would it really make any difference?
At this point it is advisable to note that, without exception, the author-
ities advocate or, at least, pay lip service to, the hypothesis that where there is
the essential ingredient of a specific intent, malice or some state of mind in-
volved, the insane probably will not be held liable. The reason given is that
he is not capable of forming this mental element. The astonishing and incredu-
lous fact is that all but one of the cases we have taken up so far fall into the
category of what today are the so-called "intentional torts"! While these in-
tentional torts are a relatively new feature of tort law, they do stem from acts
which historically have been considered to have a certain state of mind as an
essential ingredient.
54 174 Okla. 116, 50 P. 2d 162 (1935).
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There were uncovered only a few cases 55 where the action against the lun-
atic was one for negligence. All of these have held the insane person liable
for failure to conform to the standard of conduct required of the sane man.56
At least theoretically, there is some objection to holding a lunatic responsible
for his negligent acts, especially if his insanity amounts to a total derangement,
since one absolutely devoid of the power to understand and to reason is also
lacking the capacity to realize the risk of injury to another person which his
act may involve. No standard of care can give such a person the ability to think
and to reason. 57 More on this point in a later section.
V Theories Favoring Liability
There are three reasons usually given to support the argument that in-
sane persons should be held accountable for their torts. 58 The first is that,
where a loss has been incurred, it must be borne by him who occasioned it.
The second is the fear that as insanity is sometimes feigned, the defense of
insanity would be fraudulently used to escape liability for tortious acts. And third,
that if lunatics are made liable for their torts, their custodians and those in-
terested in their welfare will keep a closer surveillance over them. Professor
Prosser has added another and fourth reason 59-the fear of introducing into
the law of torts the confusion and unsatisfactory tests attending the proof of
insanity in criminal cases.
The first reason given probably has the least merit. "The rule that where
one of two innocent persons must bear a loss, he must bear it whose act caused
it is not, in this absolute form, in accordance with the authorities; while the
reasons of public policy which are put forward are totally unsupported." 6 0 This
theory probably was born out of dictum in an early Pennsylvania case, 61 and
given impetus by being adopted by Judge Cooley in his treatise on the law of
torts. The plain truth is that it simply is not true today. Primitive law regard-
ed the words and the acts of the individual; it did not search his heart. 62 Grad-
ually, however, as our civilization became more advanced, strict liability evolved
into our present theory of liability with fault. We no longer ask "Did the de-
fendant do the physical act which damaged the plaintiff?" The law today, ex-
cept in certain notable exceptions based on public policy, asks further "Was
the act blameworthy?"
55 Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y. Supp. 446 (1934); Parke v. Dennard,
218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396 (1928); Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894).
accord: Jenkins v. Hankins, 98 Tenn. 545, 41 S.W. 1028 (1897) ; Leary v. Oates, Tex. Civ.
App., 84 S.W. 2d 486 (1935).
56 PROSSER, TORTS § 108, p. 1092 (1941); Also see Frances H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of
Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1924).
57 28 AM. JUR., § 99, p. 733 (1940).
58 Note, 34 COR. L. Q. 275 (1948).
59 PROSSEa, op. cit. supra note 56 at 1090.
60 W. G. H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COL. L. REV. 333, 337 (1921).
61 Beeds v. See, 10 Pa. 56 (1848).
62 James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1908).
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This first reason given is nothing more than strict (or absolute) liability
dressed up in Sunday-go-to-meetin' garb. In the case of the lunatic let's not
drift back into that unmoral abyss once again!
63
The second reason, the fear of insanity being feigned by the tortious,
probably is the most sound of all that are advanced by those eager to hold
the lunatic liable. However, should it not shock the public conscience to add
to the woes of all those afflicted with mental disorders just to prevent a few
from fraudulently feigning to be one of them? This hardly seems like the Amer-
ican viewpoint which frees a hundred so that one innocent man may not be
punished unjustly. In the next section a suggestion will be submitted as to
how to prevent this second reason from becoming a serious problem.
The third reason, that if insane persons are held responsible for their acts,
their custodians and those interested in their welfare will watch them more
closely, seems plausible enough at first glance. But what does it mean when
we analyze it? For one thing, those advancing this reason make reference to
the fact that those who may inherit from the insane person, or who stand in
relation to him in some way profitable to them, will act in such a way in re-
gard to the incompetent that will prevent the waste of his estate. This ap-
parently means that they will keep him from committing torts so that he will
not be liable in damages, and they will eventually get more of his money. The
assumption is that these people are aware of their legal rights and liabilities,
and will be consistently acting in respect to them. Such is seldom the case with
the laymen who rarely realize the legal consequences of their own acts, to say
nothing of expecting them to control the acts of one who is unpredictable. It
would also seem that they are attempting to make these custodians more fully
cognizant of their responsibilities in regard to the care and supervision of the
incompetents. But this is not supported by the decisions.
In one very recent case 64 a patient at a state hospital for the criminally in-
sane was released by the authorities. Almost immediately upon his release he
killed the plaintiff's decedent without provocation or motive. The state was
held not liable for "honest error" or "error in professional judgment" in re-
gard to the insane. In another recent case6 5 a person who voluntarily assumed
custody and control of an insane person was held not to be liable for the acts
of the insane person if the custodian used "ordinary care." This may sound
logical enough until we seek further to determine what the courts hold to be
ordinary care.
In another case,6 6 where the liability should have been obvious, the court
had to send the jury back twice to get them to deliver a satisfactory verdict
63 See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 56, at 17-18.
64 St. George v. State, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 147, 288 App. Div. 245, Order settled 128 N.Y.S. 2d
583 (1934).
65 Smart v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Okla. 1953).
66 Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918).
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under the instructions. A sheriff had placed another prisoner in the same cell
with a psychopathic prisoner who promptly produced a knife and slashed his
cell mate, the plaintiff, with it. The cuts produced a serious "wrist-drop" for
which he sued the sheriff and the insane person. The reason the court had such
difficulty with the jury was because of his eagerness to differentiate between
the liability of the insane person and that of the sheriff, who, it is conceded
did not even search the prisoner before incarcerating him.
In Excelsior Ins. Co. of New York v. State67 a mental incompetent, with
a past record of several escapes, again escaped from a state hospital, entered
an unlocked barn and kindled a fire burning down three buildings. In spite
of the insane person's history of escapes, the state was held not to be negligent
because its agents could not have anticipated that he would destroy any build-
ings. It was further held that the state was not even negligent in permitting his
escape.
Another case 68 was an action for wrongful death against the mother and
father of an insane person who committed a homicide. He had been released
as "safe" to be at large by the supervisors of a mental hospital. The court held
that the parents had every right to rely on the judgment of the hospital author-
ities and were in no way liable. Certainly, there is no fault to be found with
this decision, but what about the liability of these authorities?
The last case69 on this subject is downright fantastic. The insane person,
Pence Littlejohn, had been committed as dangerous for some time. His mother
secured his release by accepting "full responsibility" for his actions. About ten
days after he had returned home he began frequenting one of the local theaters
every day. Some policemen came to the house and told his parents that he
was bothering one of the actresses by making romantic advances and writing
love letters to her. The father agreed to send his son out of town. The police
warned him that he had threatened this actress and was considered dangerous.
They further admonished him that the play was moving to Portland, and to
be sure not to let the incompetent buy his own ticket out of town. They ex-
pressed fear that he would go to Portland and kill the thespian or somebody
else.
The mother, Mrs. Littlejohn, called the hospital director for advice, the
director advising that it would be wise if he sent in a guard. She suggested
sending the insane person out of town and the director, Dr. Calhoun, acquiesced.
The parents provided the deranged son with money to purchase his ticket, which
he promptly did-to Portland! While in that fair city he shot one of the stage
hands. Is this not a clear case of the parents' liability? The court said:
"We are clearly of the opinion that it must be held, as a matter
of law, that Dr. Calhoun is not liable for the damages complained
67 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E. 2d 553 (1946).
68 Bollinger, Adm'r. v. Rader, 153 N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910).
69 Emery v. Littlejohn, 83 Wash. 334, 145 Pac. 423 (1915).
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of in this case upon the ground that he acted in an official capacity in
a matter involving his discretion, and did not act maliciously or cor-
ruptly." 70
and again:
"Is there any sound legal basis upon which appellants Littlejohn
and wife may be held liable in damages to respondent because of the
unfortunate injuries resulting to him from the apparent insane act of
Pence? We are constrained to hold, as a matter of law, that there is
not. One is not liable for his every act that may ultimately result in
wrong to another. He is only responsible for that which, in the light
of experience of mankind, he should reasonably anticipate as liable to
happen; not that which might barely possibly happen as the result of
his act." 71
These cases do not seem to indicate that there has been any specific at-
tempt on the part of the courts to make those in charge of the incompetents
more fully aware of their responsibilities. The frequency of assaults, batteries
and homicides committed by ex-mental patients which permeate the press point
out the astonishing number of "honest errors" or "errors in professional judg-
ment" with no apparent accompanying liability.
In due deference to Professor Prosser, the fourth reason given is also faulty.
It is better to use the McNaughton rules, or a modern version of them, for
criminal cases than to hold all insane persons liable for all the crimes they
may commit. Mental disease is a nebulous thing at best, and no rule govern-
ing it will be infallible; but certainly an imperfect rule is better than no rule
at all in such a case. Besides, why should we take a defeatist's attitude? Just
because the criminal law rules on insanity fall far short of perfection is no
reason why we should throw up our hands and say the same thing will happen
in the tort field. We would not be hampered by past decisions and a frantic
attempt to keep them up with the times.
VI Conclusion
At this point, it may be advisable to point out to the reader that this article
has been concerned only with the liability of insane persons in tort actions, as
the title implies. The standards to which an insane person is held as to de-
fenses has not been touched upon. There is little or no authority on this phase
of the law. In fact, there is such a dearth of authority to support argument
either way that the Restatement has taken no stand on the subject by a caveat.72
However, in Section 464 the language spells out the fact that the editors feel
the standard of conduct required for children and insane persons is something
less than the reasonable man standard. This writer feels that this is the con-
cept which should govern the whole law of torts on the insanity question.
70 Id. at 347.
71 Id. at 348.
72 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 464, p. 1228 (1934).
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It has been pointed out that the maxim that a "lunatic is liable for his
tortious acts" stems from the early, inconsistent dictum in the Weaver case; that
while lip service is paid to the notion that the incompetent should not be liable
where malice or intent is an essential ingredient, yet there is no attempt made
to differentiate between negligent acts and intentional torts; that the civil law
excuses the lunatic when his type of insanity deprives him of the knowledge
that his act is wrong (if he, indeed, even knows he is committing an act);
and, finally, that the reasons given in support of the American view are inef-
fectual and unconvincing.
The insane person is not free from liability when he has sought refuge
in the institutions established for his care and treatment. When a hospital at-
tendant was warned not to enter the defendant's room without another attend-
ant, and did so in disobedience to these orders, and was assaulted by the luna-
tic, the lunatic was held liable. The jury found the plaintiff had invited the
attack by his actions, but this was rejected by the court.7 3 For some unex-
plained reason the plaintiff dropped his suit against the hospital and was satis-
fied to sue only the incompetent.
The Restatement editors in their 1934 edition had this to say on the sub-
ject:
"Unless the actor is a child or an insane person the standard of
conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of a reasonable man under like circumstances. 7 4 (Emphasis added.)
In a caveat they added this:
"Caveat: The institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane
persons are required to conform to the standard of behaviour which
society demands of sane persons for the protection of the interests of
others." 75
However in the 1948 Supplement the editors changed their position. They
deleted "or an insane person" from the first quotation from the Restatement
above, and also, deleted the entire caveat above. The reason given was that,
while formerly there was no authority to make it possible to state a rule, now
there is sufficient authority. Many of the cases used in this article were then
cited.
The Restatement change of position is given to indicate to the reader the
trend of legal thought in the United States which, on this subject, far from ad-
vancing into our more ethical viewpoint of "liability with fault," is drifting back
into the medieval "absolute liability" view. Some changes must be effected.
"For a branch of learning which consists largely of definition the
law is strangely lax in the use of the word 'insanity'. Unfortunately,
the word has no technical meaning in either law or medicine, and it
78 Van Vooren v. Cook, 273 App. Div. 88, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 362 (4th Dept. 1947).
74 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283, pp. 741-2.
75 Id. at 744.
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is used by the courts and the legislators indiscriminately to convey either
of two meanings: (1) any type of mental defect or disease, or (2)
such degree of mental defect or disease as to entail legal conse-
quences.. . ."76
It is certain that the difficulties of using the word 'insanity' as a tool in ac-
curate expression have become so obvious and well recognized that it should
be discarded. Of course, we will have to use the term occasionally, as it ap-
pears frequently in the cases and writings, but we need new terms to denote
the particular type or degree of mental disorder we are referring to, and which
produce legal consequences. 7  It is suggested that the legal profession collab-
orate with the medical profession in introducing these new terms so that they
will have the same connotations within both professions.
It is submitted that medical testimony today is not given proper credence
by the trial courts. The limitation on the judge's discretion in the matter of in-
sanity can be best illustrated by citing State v. Patterson.78 Three medical ex-
perts on a court appointed commission declared the defendant insane. Only
one lay witness stated that the accused "was capable of answering questions put
to him." At the end of the hearing the trial judge found the accused sane,
stating that the presumption is that a man is sane until the contrary is proved
by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Many times decisions like this will be
appealed to a state supreme court which rectifies such abuse of discretion at the
trial level. 79 But it must be assumed that quite a few cases do not go up on
appeal and the error stands. The trial courts should not be censored too harsh-
ly on this point, however. Sitting on case after case, and listening to one medi-
cal expert on one side contradict the expert on the other side is not conducive
to anything but skepticism.
"It has been said judicially that expert opinion, like lay opinion, can
rise no higher than the facts upon which it is based, and courts have not hesi-
tated to substitute their opinions for those of the medical expert...-s0 Courts
have occasionally gone so far as to term expert medical testimony as the weak-
est and most unsatisfactory kind of evidence;81 or even as "valueless." 82 Any
such attitude by the courts as this would have to be changed before the next
recommendation would have any value.
That recommendation is that a permanent commission be authorized in each
court district to act as a perpetual lunacy commission. The members would be
76 WERHOFFEN, INSANITY As A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW, 11 (1933).
77 See Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH.
L. REV. 1191 (1940).
78 176 La. 440, 146 So. 17 (1933).
79 See Charest D. Thibant, Present Insanity--Its Scope and Determination, 6 LA. L. REV. 693
(1946).
80 Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53
YALE L. J. 271, 285 (1944).
81 In re Collins' Estate, 174 Cal. 663, 670, 164 Pac. 1110, 1113 (1917).
82 Davis v. Phillips, 85 Mich. 198, 203, 48 N.W. 513, 514 (1891).
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drawn from the medical profession, including one psychiatrist to act as chair-
man. It could also include one member from outside the profession, a quali-
fied clinical psychologist. This board or commission would pass on the sanity
of all persons where such is doubted or in question. It is hoped that, through
an extensive use of commissions such as this, the incidence of those who would
feign mental derangement to relieve themselves of liability for their tortious
acts would be kept at a minimum.
The liability ". . . of mental defectives for the damage they cause
should bear a definite relation to the degree of reason which the actor
possesses. Mental defectives who possess no capacity to reason at the time
of the commission of the act should be considered incapable of legal
fault. Persons who possess some degree of reason, but who are below
the normal standard, should be capable of legal fault only in those
areas of action which lie within their capacity to reason. Guardians
of all types of mental defectives should be held to a standard of lia-
bility based on fault in the accomplishment of their duty," 83
rather than to a standard of liability without fault. However, let's not treat
them with "kid gloves" and use every legal twist and technicality to release
them from liability.
It has been said that perhaps the ideal solution would be to allow the
court to exercise its own discretion in ordering the lunatic to pay such compen-
sation as seems equitable under the circumstances of the case, having regard
especially to the relative pecuniary situations of the parties. 8 4 Perhaps it would
seem inequitable to permit the extremely wealthy lunatic to escape from com-
pensating the impecunious person he has damaged. But this would so rarely be
the case that it is more of academic interest than practical, and could be taken
care of as the situations arise. Besides, the millionaire is never insane-only ec-
centric!
To be sure it "is no adequate balm to an injured person to be told that
while all the elements of tort liability exist in his case, the incident that the
wrongdoer was an incompetent precludes a recovery." 85 But does this really
differ from accidents which are considered acts of God? "An act of an insane
person is not regarded as an act of God" 86 normally, however, the same ele-
ments would appear to be present in each instance. Can lunatics be said to be
at fault simply because they are lunatics and "know not what they do?" The
question would seem to answer itself without further recourse to the scriptures.
Probably there is no better way to conclude this article than to quote from
one of our most eminent jurists, Mr. Justice Holmes:
83 Insane Persons-Liability in Tort-Liability of Guardian, 21 TULANE L. REV. 679, 682,
683 (1947).
84 See 22 MINN. L. REV. 853, 862 (1938).
85 28 AM. JUR., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, § 93, p. 729 (1940).
86 See Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S.E. 679 (1905).
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"There is no doubt that in many cases a man may be insane, and
yet perfectly capable of taking precautions, and being influenced by
the motives, which the circumstances demand. But if insanity of a
permanent type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from com-
plying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would require
it to be admitted as an excuse."
8
It is submitted that the concepts of liability of the insane person in our
law should be reformed, and the courts should cease treating these unfor-
tunate, afflicted persons like stepchildren in the law.
88
87 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 109 (1881).
88 The following state statutes have provisions that insane persons are liable for torts no mat-
ter the degree of insanity: CAL. CIVIL CODE § 41 (1937); MONT. REV. CODE § 5686 (1935),
N. D. COMP. LAWS §§ 4346, 4347 (1913); OKLA. STAT. §§ 9405, 9406 (1931); S. D. Comp.
LAWS §§ 89, 90 (1929).
